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ABSTRACT
The stable marriage problem requires one to find a marriage with no blocking pair. Given a matching
that is not stable, Roth and Vande Vate have shown that there exists a sequence of matchings that
leads to a stable matching in which each successive matching is obtained by satisfying a blocking
pair. The sequence produced by Roth and Vande Vate’s algorithm is of length O(n3) where n is the
number of men (and women). In this paper, we present an algorithm that achieves stability in a se-
quence of matchings of lengthO(n2). We also give an efficient algorithm to find the stable matching
closest to the given initial matching under an appropriate distance function between matchings.
1 Introduction
The Stable Matching ProblemGale and Shapley (1962) has wide applications in economics, distributed computing, re-
source allocation andmany other fieldsMaggs and Sitaraman (2015); Iwama and Miyazaki (2008) with multiple books
and survey articles Gusfield and Irving (1989); Knuth (1997); Roth and Sotomayor (1992); Iwama and Miyazaki
(2008); David (2013). In the standard version of the problem, there are n men and n women each with their to-
tally ordered preference list. The goal is to find a matching between men and women such that there is no blocking
pair, i.e., there is no pair of a woman and a man such that they are not married to each other but prefer each other over
their partners. The standard Gale-Shapley (GS) algorithm produces such a matching starting from an empty matching
with the deferred acceptance proposal algorithm that takesO(n2) proposals. The algorithm produces the man-optimal
stable matching.
In many applications, it is useful to consider the initial state of the system as an arbitrary assignment of men to women
and then to find a path to a stable matching. For example, suppose that we consider a system in which there are more
women than men and suppose that every man is matched to a unique woman such that there is no blocking pair. Now,
if a new man or a woman joins the system, it is more natural to start with the initial state as the existing assignment
rather than the empty matching. In particular, if there is some cost associated with breaking up an existing couple,
then we may be interested in the paths to stability that are of short lengths. Hence, this generalization allows one to
consider incremental stable matching algorithms.
As another example, suppose that we have a stable matching. In a dynamic preference mechanism, a woman may
change her list of preferences. The existing matching may not be stable under new preferences of the woman. Again,
it is more natural to start with the existing matching and then to find a path to a stable matching under new preferences.
Thus, the generalization allows one to consider a dynamic stable matching algorithm in which preferences of a man or
a woman may change and the goal is to find a stable matching under new preferences.
Given a matching, a natural method to make progress towards a stable matching is as follows. The man and the woman
in the blocking pair are married and their spouses are divorced. By marrying these divorcees, we get another matching.
The reader is referred to the book David (2013) for a detailed discussion of algorithms that go from a matching to a
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stable matching. Knuth Knuth (1997) showed that starting from any matching and iteratively satisfying a blocking
pair may lead to a cycle. Abeledo and Rothblum Abeledo and Rothblum (1995) have shown that a cycle exists even if
one chooses the best blocking pair to satisfy at each step. A pair (p, q′) is the best blocking pair for p if for any other
blocking pair (p, q) in M , p prefers q′ to q. Indeed, it has been shown by Tamura Tamura (1993) and independently
by Tan and Su Tan and Su (1995), that there are matchings for which it is not possible to reach a stable marriage by
marrying off divorcees. However, if the divorcees are allowed to remain single, then one can achieve stability. The
Roth and Vande Vate (RVV) mechanism Roth and Vate (1990) is the most well known method to determine a path
to stability. Their algorithm introduces agents (men or women) incrementally and let them iteratively reach a stable
matching. Given any matching M0, the RVV mechanism produces a sequence of matchings M0,M1, . . . ,Mt such
thatMt is stable matching and for each k (1 ≤ k ≤ t),Mk is obtained fromMk−1 by satisfying a blocking pair. The
value of t is at most 2n3 (assuming that the number of acceptable pairs is n2).
In this paper, we analyze the path to stability from the perspective of traversal in the proposal vector lattice. Any
man-saturating matching corresponds to a unique proposal vector but when the matching is incomplete there may
be multiple proposal vectors corresponding to it. Working with proposal vectors instead of matching allows us to
generate shorter sequences to a stable matching. In particular, we show that given any proposal vector G0, there
exists a sequence of proposal vectors G0, G1, . . . , Gt such that Gt corresponds to a stable matching and for each k
(1 ≤ k ≤ t), Gk is obtained from Gk−1 by either increasing the choice number for one man (thereby worsening his
match) or decreasing the choice number for one man (thereby improving his match). The value of t is at most 2m2
wherem is the number of men. Our result can also be phrased in terms of matching as follows. Given any matching
M0, there exists a sequence of matchingM0,M1, . . . ,Mt such thatMt corresponds to a stable matching and for each
k (1 ≤ k ≤ t),Mk is obtained fromMk−1 by either (1) marrying a man whose current partner is in a blocking pair (or,
if he is single) to another woman who is agreeable to his proposal, or (2) by marrying a woman to her best blocking
pair partner. The value of t is at most 2m2 where m is the number of men. Thus, this sequence is shorter than the
RVV sequence by a factor ofm.
We propose four algorithms in this paper for achieving stability (see Fig. 1). The first algorithm α is a generalization
of the GS algorithm to find the man-optimal marriage. The GS algorithm starts with the matching that results when all
men propose to their top choice. It then determines the man-optimal stable marriage in O(n2) moves. What if instead
of the top choices, men propose to any arbitrary vector of women? In such a scenario, a woman cannot accept the first
proposal she receives (as in the GS algorithm), because that may result in an unstable matching. Algorithm α gives
the rules for advancing from an arbitrary proposal vector to end up in a stable marriage (whenever possible). Given
any initial matching M0, algorithm α produces a sequence of matchings ending in a stable marriage Mt such that
the matching only improves from the perspective of women and gets only worse from the perspective of men. This
sequence is of length O(n2). Since there may not exist any stable matching that is based only on improving from the
women’s perspective, algorithm α may return null in these cases (for example, when the initial matchingM0 assigns
some man a partner who is ranked lower than in the man-pessimal matching). The set of stable matchings can be
viewed as a sublattice of the lattice of all proposal vectors and the algorithm α can be viewed as upward traversal in
this lattice from any arbitrary proposal vector to a proposal vector that corresponds to a stable matching.
One of the goals of the paper is to find a matching that is not too far from the original matching (or the initial proposal
vector). Given any proposal vector I , the regret of a man is defined as the rank the woman he is assigned in I , i.e.,
if a man is assigned his kth top choice in I then his regret is k. Given two proposal vectors I and M , we define the
distance between I andM , dist(I,M) as the sum of differences of regrets for all men in I andM , i.e. the L1 distance
between two vectors, dist(I,M) = ‖I −M‖1. Algorithm α guarantees that the stable matchingMt computed has
the least distance of all stable matchings that are better than I from the women’s perspective.
The second algorithm β does the downward traversal in the proposal lattice in search of a stable marriage. Algorithm
β also takes an arbitrary proposal vector I as the starting point and results in a stable marriage whenever possible. It
improves the matching from the perspective of men. When men and women are equal then such a traversal can be
accomplished by switching the roles of men and women. However, in this paper we assume that the number of men
m may be much smaller than the number of women w. All our algorithms have time complexity of O(m2 + w).
Switching the roles of men and women is not feasible without increasing the complexity of our algorithms. Algorithm
β guarantees that the stable matchingMt computed has the least distance of all stable matchings that are better than I
from the men’s perspective.
The third algorithm γ combines a downward traversal with an upward traversal to guarantee that irrespective of the
initial matching I , there always exists a sequence of matchings that results in a stable matching. This sequence
consists of two subsequences each of lengthO(m2) giving us the path to stability of lengthO(m2), thereby improving
on the RVV mechanism. Intuitively, the RVV algorithm may traverse the lattice in the upward direction or downwards
direction multiple times. In contrast, our algorithm γ traverses the proposal lattice once in the downward direction and
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then in the upward direction ending in a stable matching. It generates a sequence of proposal vectors that results in a
stable matching with O(m2 + w) time complexity.
Our last algorithm δ finds the closest stable matching to the given initial proposal vector. Algorithm δ is based on
a linear programming formulation of the stable marriage problem by Rothblum Rothblum (1992). By appropriately
defining the objective function to minimize the distance from the initial proposal vector, we get a polynomial time
algorithm to find the closest stable marriage.
Our algorithms are also useful in the context of arriving at more egalitarian matchings than we get using the Gale-
Shapley algorithm. If there aremmen, instead of starting with the proposal vector (1, 1, . . . , 1), we may start with the
proposal vector (m/2,m/2, . . . ,m/2) to find a stable vector close to the center of the proposal lattice. Alternatively,
we can also start with various proposal vectors chosen at random and obtain multiple stable matchings. Once we have
multiple stable matchings, we can use Teo and Sethuraman’s median stable matching theorem Teo and Sethuraman
(1998) to return the median stable matching.
We note here that the path to a stable matching from an unstable matching can be of different types. Given any
blocking pair, the RVV algorithm is based on a better response dynamics. Under these dynamics, any blocking pair
(p, q) for a matching M is chosen and they are matched. The partners of p and q in M , if any, are unmatched. An
alternative approach based on best response dynamics is explored in Ackermann et al. (2011). Here, one side, say the
set of women, is considered active and the other side is considered passive. An active agent of a blocking pair (p, q) in
M plays the best response if p is matched to q′ such that (p, q′) is the best blocking pair for p. In other words, if there
is any other blocking pair (p, q) in M , then p prefers q′ to q. The paper Ackermann et al. (2011) gives an example
of a two sided market with three men and women in which best response dynamics can cycle. They also propose an
algorithm to generate a sequence of 2mw best responses from any matchingM that leads to a stable matching. Their
algorithm has some similarities with our algorithm in that it also consists of two phases. In the first phase, only matched
women can make best response moves whereas in the second phase all women can play the best response. However,
a crucial difference from our algorithm is that we are interested in finding a matching that is close to the original
matching (where the distance is defined based on the proposal lattice). The algorithm in Ackermann et al. (2011) does
not concern itself with the issue of the distance between matchings. In particular, under the best response dynamics,
their algorithm has the tendency to get to the woman-optimal marriage irrespective of the initial matching. In contrast,
our algorithms provide guarantees on the matching returned. For example, Algorithm α returns the proposal vector
that has the least distance from I , the initial proposal vector of all the proposal vectors that are bigger than I .
In summary, the paper makes the following contributions.
• It proposes Algorithm α that takes any proposal vector (and therefore any matching) to a stable proposal
vector in O(m2 + w) time such that the resulting proposal vector has the least distance from the initial
proposal vector of all stable proposal vectors that are greater than initial proposal vector. This algorithm
generalizes the GS algorithm which assumes the initial proposal vector to be the top choices.
• It proposes Algorithm β that takes any input proposal vector and generates a stable proposal vector that has
the least distance from the initial proposal vector to all stable proposal vectors that are less than or equal to
the initial proposal vector. This algorithm give a dual of the GS algorithm in which the active agents improve
their choices to get a stable proposal vector (if one exists).
• It proposes Algorithm γ that takes any input proposal vector and always generates a stable proposal vector
by combining aspects of algorithms α and β.
• It proposes a polynomial time algorithm δ (based on linear programming) that takes any input proposal vector
and generates a stable proposal vector that is closest to the input proposal vector.
2 Proposal Vector Lattice
We consider stable marriage instances withm men numbered 1, 2, . . . ,m and w women numbered 1, 2, . . .w. We as-
sume that the number of womenw is at leastm; otherwise, the roles of men and women can be switched. The variables
mpref and wpref specify the men preferences and the women preferences, respectively. Thus, mpref [i][k] = j iff
woman j is the kth preference for man i. Fig. 2 shows an instance of the stable matching problem.
We use the notion of a proposal vector for our algorithms. A (man) proposal vector,G, is of dimensionm, the number
of men. We view any vector G as follows: (G[i] = k) if man i has proposed to his kth preference, i.e. the woman
given by mpref [i][k]. If mpref [i][k] equals j, then G[i] equals k corresponds to man i proposing to woman j. For
convenience, let ρ(G, i) denote the woman mpref [i][G[i]]. The vector (1, 1, . . . , 1) corresponds the proposal vector
in which every man has proposed to his top choice. Similarly, (w,w, . . . , w) corresponds to the vector in which every
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unstable vectors
stable vectors
(1, 1, · · · , 1)
man-optimal
GS
δ
β
α
γ
(w,w, · · · , w)
woman-optimal
Figure 1: A proposal lattice with various traversals. Algorithm GS always starts from the bottom of the lattice and
finds the man-optimal vector. Algorithm α starts from any vector I and finds the smallest stable vector which is greater
than or equal to I (if any exists). Algorithm β finds the largest stable vector which is less than or equal to I . Algorithm
γ always converges to a stable vector. Algorithm δ finds a stable vector that is closest in Manhattan metric.
man has proposed to his last choice. Our algorithms can also handle the case when the lists are incomplete, i.e., a man
prefers staying alone to being matched to some women. However, for simplicity, we assume complete lists. It is clear
that the set of all proposal vectors forms a distributive lattice under the natural less than order in which the meet and
join are given by the component-wise minimum and the component-wise maximum, respectively. This lattice has wm
elements.
Given any proposal vector, G, there is a unique matching defined as follows: man i and ρ(G, i) are matched in G if
the proposal by man i is the best for that woman in G. A man p is unmatched in G if his proposal is not the best
proposal for that woman in G. A woman q is unmatched in G if she does not receive any proposal in G; otherwise,
she is matched with the best proposal for her in G.
A proposal vector G represents a man-saturating matching iff no woman receives more than one proposal in G.
Formally, G is a man-saturating matching if ∀i, j : i 6= j : ρ(G, i) 6= ρ(G, j). When the number of men equals
the number women, a man-saturating matching is a perfect matching (all men and women are matched). When the
number of men is less than the number of women, then G is a man-saturating matching if every man is matched (but
some women are unmatched). We say that a matching M1 (or a marriage) is less than another matching M2 if the
proposal vector for M1 is less than that of M2. Thus, the man-optimal marriage is the least stable matching in the
proposal lattice and woman-optimal marriage is the greatest stable matching.
A proposal vector G may have one or more blocking pairs. A pair of man and woman (p, q) is a blocking pair in G
iff ρ(G, p) is not q, man p prefers q to ρ(G, p), and woman q prefers p to any proposal she receives in G. Observe
that this definition works even when woman q is unmatched, i.e. she has not received any proposals in G. In this case,
woman q prefers p to staying alone, and p prefers q to ρ(G, p).
A proposal vector G is a stable marriage (or a stable proposal vector) iff it is a man-saturating matching and there are
no blocking pairs in G. The usual stable matching problem is to determine such a proposal vector givenmpref and
wpref . The problem that we consider in this paper includes an additional input: the initial proposal vector, I . The
goal is to traverse the proposal lattice starting from I to find a stable proposal vector G. In this paper, we use two
different mechanisms — upward traversal and downward traversal — to reach a stable matching proposal vector.
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mpref wpref
m1 w1 w2 w3 w1 m2 m1 m3
m2 w2 w3 w1 w2 m3 m2 m1
m3 w3 w1 w2 w3 m1 m3 m2
Figure 2: Stable Matching Problem with men preference list (mpref ) and women preference list (wpref ).
Algorithm α uses upward traversal. Suppose that q is matched with p′ in G and is part of the blocking pair (p, q).
Instead of satisfying the blocking pair (p, q), we move p′ to his next choice in his preference list. This move makes
the proposal vector better from the women’s perspective and worse from the men’s perspective. By continuing in this
manner if some man makes a proposal to q who is even better than p, the blocking pair (p, q) gets eliminated. If no
man better than p ever makes a proposal to q, then there is no proposal vector bigger than G that corresponds to a
stable matching.
Algorithm β uses downward traversal in the proposal lattice. Let G be a proposal vector that is not stable. Of all the
blocking pairs that q is part of, we choose the best blocking pair from q’s perspective. Let (p, q) be such a blocking
pair. We construct a proposal vector G′ that moves man p to woman q by changing the proposal of man p from his
current proposal to that for woman q and keeping all other proposals as before.
Since Algorithm α traverses the lattice upwards, any sequence of proposal vector it generates can be of length at most
m2. Similarly, Algorithm β also generates a sequence of length at most m2. Algorithm γ combines one downward
traversal and one upward traversal to go from any proposal vector to a stable matching proposal vector in a sequence
of length at most O(m2).
We now describe Algorithms α, β and γ in detail.
3 Algorithm α: Upward Traversal
Given any initial proposal vector I , Algorithm α, finds a stable matching G such that I ≤ G whenever there exists
such a stable matching. The initial proposal vector is arbitrary instead of the top choice for each man. This generalizes
the GS algorithm which starts with I = (1, 1, . . . , 1). Observe that the GS algorithm does not work when the starting
proposal vector is arbitrary. The GS algorithm requires men to make proposals and women to accept the best proposals
they have received so far. If the starting proposal vector is a man-saturating matching but not stable, then each woman
gets a unique proposal. All women would accept the only proposal received, but the resulting marriage would not be
stable.
This instability may arise due to two reasons. First, it may arise when the number of women exceeds the number
of men. If we start with the top choices of all men, then the GS algorithm would still return a man-optimal stable
matching with the excess women unmatched. However, if we start from an arbitrary proposal vector, we can end up
with all women getting unique proposals but there may exist an unmatched woman who is preferred by some man over
his current match.
To tackle this problem, we first do a simple check on the initial proposal vector as given by the following Lemma. Let
numw(I) be the total number of unique women that have been proposed in all vectors that are less than or equal to I ,
i.e., numw(I) = #{j ∈ [w] : ∃G ≤ I, ∃i, ρ(G, i) = j}.
Lemma 1 Let I be the initial proposal vector for any stable marriage instance with m men. There is no stable
marriage for any proposal vector G ≥ I whenever numw(I) > m.
Proof: Consider any proposal vector G ≥ I . Since the total number of men is m, there is at least one woman q who
has been proposed to in a vector less than G and who does not have any proposal in G. Suppose that proposal was
made by man p. Then, man p prefers q to ρ(G, p) and q prefers p to staying alone.
Hence, in our algorithm we only consider I such that the total number of women proposed until I (in all vectors less
than or equal to I) is at mostm.
Instability may arise even when the number of men and women are equal. In Fig. 2, this situation would arise if we
started with I = (2, 2, 2). The initial proposal vector may be a perfect matching but not stable. A woman q may
receive a unique proposal from a man p but she prefers p′ who has made his proposal to q′ even though p′ prefers q
to q′. Such a scenario cannot happen when men propose starting from the top choice and in the decreasing order as in
the GS algorithm. However, now the starting vector is arbitrary and a blocking pair may exist in the man-saturating
matching.
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input: A stable marriage instance, initial proposal vector I
output: smallest stable marriage greater than or equal to I (if one exists)
forbidden(G, i) holds if i is unmatched or his partner forms a blocking pair in G.
(0) If numw(I) > m then return null else G := I;
(1) while there exists a man i such that forbidden(G, i)
(2) let q be the next woman in the list of man i such that i has the most preferred proposal to q,
(3) if no such choice after G[i] or the number of women proposed including q exceedsm then
return null; // ”no stable matching exists”
(4) else G[i] := choice that corresponds to woman q;
(5) endwhile;
(6) return G;
Figure 3: Algorithm α that returns the least stable vector greater than or equal to the given proposal vector I .
To address this problem, we define the notion of a forbidden man in a proposal vector.
Definition 1 (forbidden) A man i is forbidden in G if either he is unmatched in G or matched to a woman in G who
is part of a blocking pair. Formally, the predicate forbidden(G, i) holds if there exists another man j such that either
(1) both i and j have proposed to the same woman in G and that woman prefers j, or (2) (j, ρ(G, i)) is a blocking
pair in G.
We first show that
Lemma 2 Let G be any proposal vector such that numw(G) ≤ m. There exists a man i such that forbidden(G, i)
iff G is not a stable marriage.
Proof: First suppose that there exists i such that forbidden(G, i). This mean that there exists a man j such that j has
proposed to the same woman and that woman prefers j or (j, ρ(G, i)) is a blocking pair in G. If both i and j have
proposed to the same woman in G, then it is clearly not a matching. If (j, ρ(G, i)) is a blocking pair then G is not
stable.
Conversely, assume that G is not a stable marriage. This means that either G is not a man-saturating matching or
there is a blocking pair for G. If it is not a man-saturating matching, then there must be some woman who has been
proposed by multiple men. Any man i who is not the most favored in the set of proposals satisfies forbidden(G, i).
If G is a man-saturating matching but not a stable marriage, then there must be a blocking pair (p, q). If q has been
proposed in G by man i, then (p, ρ(G, i)) is a blocking pair, and therefore forbidden(G, i) holds. If q has not been
proposed in G then we know there are at leastm+ 1 women that are in numw(G) which violates our assumption on
G.
Algorithm α shown in Fig. 3 exploits the forbidden(G, i) function to search for the stable marriage in the proposal
lattice. The basic idea is that if a man i is forbidden in the current proposal vector G, then he must go down his
preference list until he finds a woman who is either unmatched or prefers him to her current match. The while loop
at line (1) iterates until none of the men are forbidden in G. If the while loop terminates then G is a stable marriage
on account of Lemma 2. At line (2), man i advances on his preference list until his proposal is the most preferred
proposal to the woman among all proposals that are made to her in any proposal vector less than or equal toG. If there
is no such proposal, then there does not exist any G ≥ I such that G is stable and in line (3), the algorithm returns
null. Otherwise, the man makes that proposal at line (4).
For example, consider the initial proposal vectorG = (2, 2, 2) in Fig. 2. In this proposal vector, we have the matching
{(m1, w2), (m2, w3), (m3, w1)}. While this is a man-saturating matching, it is not stable because it has blocking
pairs. Consider the blocking pair (m2, w2) (because, m2 prefers w2 to w3 and w2 prefers m2 to m1). In an upward
traversal, we advance the partner of the woman w2 in the blocking pair, m1, to his next choice. The next choice for
m1 is w3. This results in w3 rejecting m2 and therefore m2 moves to his next choice w1. This proposal, in turn,
results in w1 rejecting m3. Next, m3 makes a proposal to w2 and now (m2, w2) is not a blocking pair. The new
proposal vector (3, 3, 3)which corresponds to the matching {(m1, w3), (m2, w1), (m3, w2)} is a stable matching with
all women getting their top choices.
There are two main differences between the GS algorithm and Algorithm α. The first difference is the simple check
on the number of women that have been proposed until G. We require numw(G) ≤ m. Clearly, if the number of
women is equal to the number of men, then numw(G) can never exceedm and this check can be dropped.
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The second difference is in the definition of forbidden(G, i). In the standard GS algorithm, a man advances on his
preference list only when he is unmatched, i.e., the woman he has proposed to is either matched with someone more
preferable or receives a proposal from a more preferable man. Whenever the GS algorithm reaches a man-saturating
matching, it is a stable matching. For any arbitrary I (for example, a man-saturating matching that is not stable), it is
important to take blocking pairs in consideration as part of the forbidden predicate. This difference can be summarized
as follows.
• GS Algorithm: A man proposes to the next woman on his preference list if he is currently unmatched.
• Algorithm α: A man i proposes to the next woman on his preference list if he is currently unmatched or
matched with a woman q who is in a blocking pair.
Observe that if all men propose starting from their top choices, then the rule for Algorithm α becomes identical to that
for the GS Algorithm.
To prove the correctness of the algorithm α, the following Lemma is crucial.
Lemma 3 If forbidden(G, i) holds, then there is no proposal vector H such that (H ≥ G) and (G[i] = H [i]) and
H is a stable marriage.
Proof: Consider any H such that (H ≥ G) and (G[i] = H [i]). We show that H is not a stable marriage. The
predicate forbidden(G, i) implies that there exists a man j such that ρ(G, i) prefers man j to man i and the proposal
by j to ρ(G, i) is in a proposal vector less than or equal to G. Since G ≤ H , and G[i] equals H [i], we get that
forbidden(H, i) also holds. Hence,H is not a stable marriage from Lemma 2.
A consequence of Lemma 3 is that if forbidden(G, i) holds, then it is safe to advance man i to the next choice without
any danger of missing a proposal vector that is a stable marriage. We can now show the correctness of Algorithm α.
Theorem 1 Algorithm α returns the least stable proposal vector G ≥ I in the proposal lattice whenever it exists. If
there is no stable proposal vector greater than or equal to I , then the algorithm returns null.
Proof: First suppose that a stable marriage exists that is greater than or equal to I . Since the set of stable marriages
form a sublattice of the proposal lattice Knuth (1997), there existsH , the least proposal vector that is a stable marriage
and greater than or equal to I . Consider any I ≤ G < H . By definition of H , G is not a stable marriage and there
exists i such that forbidden(G, i) due to Lemma 2. From Lemma 3, the advancement along i guarantees thatG ≤ H .
Hence, the algorithm will continue to advanceG until it is identical toH .
Now suppose that there is no stable marriage that is greater than or equal to I . In this case, the algorithm will continue
to find i such that forbidden(G, i) until some man runs out of choices. If we run out of choices, then from repeated
application of Lemma 3, there is no stable marriage which is greater than or equal to I .
The following Corollary states that the stable marriage returned by Algorithm α has the least distance of all stable
marriages greater than I .
Corollary 1 Given any proposal vector I , Algorithm α returns the stable marriage greater than or equal to I with
the least distance from I .
Proof: Suppose that Algorithm α returns G and G′ is any other stable marriage such that I ≤ G′. From Theorem 1,
we get that I ≤ G ≤ G′. It follows that the distance between I and G is less than or equal to the distance between I
and G′.
As another application of Algorithm α consider a scenario where we have a stable marriage and a new man joins the
system (we can assume that initially the number of women were more than the number of men). Instead of running the
GS from scratch, algorithm α can start from the existing proposal vector for existing men and the median choice for
the new entrant. If the existing matching had certain desirable properties (e.g. fairness), then the new stable matching
foundwould be close to the existing matching. As another example, consider a system with a stable matching. Suppose
that a man and a woman have a slight change in the order of their preferences and start preferring each other over their
spouses. Again, one can use Algorithm α that finds a stable matching which is close to the original matching.
4 Algorithm β: Downward Traversal
We now give the dual of Algorithm α that does the downward traversal in the proposal vector lattice and returns
the greatest stable marriage less than or equal to I . In the standard literature, one does not consider the dual of the
7
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input: A stable marriage instance, initial proposal vector I
output: greatest stable marriage less than or equal to I if one exists
The predicate rForbidden(G, i) holds if there exists a woman q such that q prefers i to all her pro-
posals in any vector less than or equal to G, and i prefers q to ρ(G, i).
L: proposal vector corresponding to man optimal stable marriage.
(1) for all i: G[i] := min(m, I[i]);
(2) if (∃i : G[i] < L[i]) return null; // no stable matching exists
(3) while (there exists a man i such that rForbidden(G, i))
(4) G[i]:= rank of woman q such that q prefers i most of all proposers in any vector less than G
(5) endwhile;
(6) return G;
Figure 4: Algorithm β: An Algorithm that returns the woman-optimalmarriage less than or equal to the given proposal
vector I .
GS algorithm to find the woman-optimal stable marriage. Just by switching roles of men and women from the man-
optimal GS, we get the woman-optimal GS algorithm. We cannot employ this strategy because we had assumed that
the number of men is less than or equal to the number of women. Switching men and women violates this assumption.
In addition, the downward traversal of the proposal lattice gives different insights into the algorithm for finding a stable
matching even when the number of men equals the number of women.
We first give a necessary condition for a stable marriage to exist that is less than or equal to I .
Lemma 4 If numw(I) (the number of unique women who have proposals in any vector less than or equal to I) is
less thanm, then there cannot be any stable proposal vector less than or equal to I .
Proof: The claim follows because any proposal vector less than or equal to I cannot be a man-saturating matching if
the number of unique women is less thanm.
If numw(I) ≥ m, there may or may not be a proposal vector that corresponds to a stable marriage depending upon
the women’s preferences.
While traversing the proposal lattice in the downward direction, we use the predicate rForbidden(G, p) (short for
reverse-Forbidden) which uses the notion of best blocking pair.
Definition 2 (Best blocking pair) A blocking pair (p, q) is the best blocking pair in G for q if for all blocking pairs
(p′, q) in G, the woman q prefers p to p′.
Definition 3 (rForbidden) A man p is rForbidden in G if there exists a woman q such that (p, q) is the best blocking
pair in G for q.
We first show that
Lemma 5 Let G be any proposal vector such that numw(G) ≥ m. There exists a man i such that rForbidden(G, i)
iff G is not a stable marriage.
Proof: First suppose that there exists i such that rForbidden(G, i). Then, there exists a woman q such that man i and
woman q form a blocking pair for G. Hence G is not a stable marriage.
Conversely, assume that G is not a stable marriage. If G is not a man-saturating matching, then there exists at least
one woman q who has not received any proposal in G but has received it earlier because num(W ) ≥ m. Of all such
proposals to q let the most favorable proposal be from man i. Then, rForbidden(G, i) holds. IfG is a man-saturating
matching, but not stable, then there exists at least one blocking pair. Therefore, there exists at least one best blocking
pair.
Analogous to upward traversal using forbidden predicate, we get that
8
A PREPRINT - JULY 15, 2020
input: A stable marriage instance, initial proposal vector I
output: a stable marriage M
G := I;
// Downward traversal
K := max(G,U); //Compute U using Algorithm β with the initial vector as [m,m, . . . ,m];
while there exists a man i such that rForbidden(K, i)
K[i] := K[i]− 1; G[i] := G[i]− 1;
endwhile;
//Upward traversal
while there exists a man i such that forbidden(G, i)
G[i] := G[i] + 1;
endwhile;
return G;
Figure 5: Algorithm γ with O(m2 + w) complexity.
Lemma 6 Assume numw(G) ≥ m. If rForbidden(G, i) holds, then there is no stable proposal vector H such that
(H ≤ G) and (G[i] = H [i]).
Proof: If rForbidden(G, i) holds, there exists a woman q such that q prefers i to all men who have proposed to q
untilG. First suppose thatH does not have any proposal to q. Then,H cannot be stable because q is single and man i
prefers q to ρ(H, i). Now suppose that H has a proposal to q. Since H ≤ G, we know that any proposal to q in H is
less preferable to that by man i. Hence, (i, q) continues to be a blocking pair in H .
Fig. 4 shows a high-level description of a downward traversal of the proposal lattice. At line (1), we ensure that G[i]
is at most m because due to Lemma 1, we know that there cannot be any stable marriage in which any component
exceeds m. At line (2), we first ensure that G is at least equal to L, the proposal vector corresponding to the man-
optimal stable marriage. Otherwise, there cannot be a stable marriage vector less than or equal to G. At line (3) we
pick i such that rForbidden(G, i) holds. This means that there exists a woman q such that (i, q) is a best blocking
pair. At line (4), we satisfy the pair (i, q) by decreasing G[i] until ρ(G, i) = q. This step corresponds to a downward
traversal in the proposal lattice. At line (6), when we exit from the while loop, we know that G must be a stable
marriage on account of Lemma 5. This algorithm ensures that the match for any man can only improve.
For example of Algorithm β, consider the initial proposal vector G = (2, 2, 2). The pair (m2, w2) is blocking. Of
all the blocking pairs in G for w2, m2 is best. Even though w2 prefers m3 to m2, the pair (m3, w2) is not blocking
becausem3 is at his choice 2 in G and w2 corresponds to his third choice. Since m2 is the best blocking pair for w2,
we make m2 propose to w2. Hence, the new proposal vector is (2, 1, 2). In this proposal vector, w3 is unmatched
and (m3, w3) is the best blocking pair for w3. The new proposal vector is (2, 1, 1). Now, w1 is unmatched and her
best blocking pair is (m1, w1). When m1 proposes to w1, we get the stable marriage proposal vector (1, 1, 1). This
corresponds to the man-optimal stable marriage.
5 Algorithm γ: Path to Stability
We now present an algorithm that gives a path from any proposal vector to a stable marriage vector. Note that depend-
ing on the initial proposal vector, both Algorithms α and β may return null. For example, when the number of men is
equal to the number of women and the initial vector is greater than or incomparable to the woman-optimal vector, then
the algorithm α will return null. Similarly, if the initial vector is less than or incomparable to the man-optimal vector,
then the algorithm β returns null. If the initial vector is incomparable to both the man-optimal and the woman-optimal
proposal vectors, then both algorithms α and β will return null. In the RVV setting, we need to combine a downwards
traversal with an upwards traversal to go from an arbitrary proposal vector to a stable matching. There are two choices
for combining these traversals — a downward traversal followed by an upwards traversal, or vice-versa. We will use
the former approach. The RVV algorithm introduces men and women incrementally and does multiple upward and
downward traversals.
The Algorithm γ is shown in Fig. 5. Given any arbitrary initial vector I , we first do a downward traversal to get to a
proposal vector that is less than or equal to U , the largest possible stable marriage. If the initial vector is at most U ,
then this step is not necessary. U can be computed using Algorithm β by using a downward traversal starting from
the vector [m,m, . . . ,m]. Our goal is to find blocking pairs in G such that by satisfying them we get to a proposal
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input: A stable marriage instance, initial proposal vector I
output: a stable marriage M
compute U using Algorithm β with the initial vector as [m,m, . . . ,m];
G := I; K := max(G,U);
while there exists a man i such that (i, q) is a best blocking pair in K
set K[i] and G[i] to the choice corresponding to woman q;
generate a matching that satisfies the blocking pair (i, q);
endwhile;
while there exists a man i such that i unmatched or (i, q) is a blocking pair in G
set G[i] to the next woman q who would accept proposal from i;
generate a matching that moves the man i from the current partner to q;
endwhile;
return G;
Figure 6: Algorithm γ that generates a sequence of matchings.
vector G ≤ U . In contrast to algorithms in literature, we pick blocking pairs to satisfy carefully. Specifically, during
the downward traversal, we satisfy only those men whose component in the proposal vector is beyond U . To find a
sequence from I to G such that G ≤ U , we first compute a vector K as max(U,G). We now invoke a downward
traversal onK using rForbidden function of algorithm β. Since Algorithm β returns the greatest stable marriage less
than the initial proposal vector (in our case K), it finds as blocking pair only those men i such that K[i] > U [i]. By
definition of rForbidden any j such that K[j] equals U [j] can not satisfy rForbidden(K, j) because U is a stable
marriage.
Lemma 7 LetK = max(G,U). Then, for any i, rForbidden(K, i) implies rForbidden(G, i).
Proof: Suppose i is not rForbidden in G. This means that there exists a stable marriage H less than or equal to G
such that H [i] = G[i]. Since G is less than or equal to K , we get that H is a stable marriage less than or equal to K .
However, this implies that i is not rForbidden in K . Since i is
rForbidden in G it is safe to decrementG[i] in search for a stable marriage. By repeating this process, we generate a
sequence of proposal vectors that makes G less than or equal to U . Note that consecutive proposal vectors generated
in this phase differ in the proposals by at most one man. The downward traversal step can be viewed as invocation of
Algorithm β on K such that whenever K is updated, G is updated as well. This downward traversal can be done in
O(m2 + w) time. At the end of this step G ≤ U , and we can start the second phase of the algorithm.
In the second phase, we do an upward traversal in which women improve their match. We use the function α to find
the least stable marriage that is greater than or equal to G. In this phase, we satisfy blocking pairs by improving the
match of women. Since the input to algorithm α is less than or equal to U , we are guaranteed to get a stable marriage
at the end.
Hence, we have the following result.
Theorem 2 Given any initial proposal vector I , there exists a sequence of proposal vectors G0, G1, . . . , Gt such that
G0 is equal to I , Gt corresponds to a stable matching and for each k (1 ≤ k ≤ t), Gk is obtained from Gk−1 by
either increasing the choice number for one man (thereby worsening his match) or decreasing the choice number for
one man (thereby improving his match). The value of t is at most 2m2 wherem is the number of men.
This sequence can be obtained using algorithm γ that takes O(m2 +w) computation time given all the data structures
(preference lists and rankings) in memory.
Since the RVV Algorithm generates a sequence of matchings instead of proposal vectors, we show how to generate a
sequence of matchings explicitly instead of proposal vectors in Fig. 6. The downward traversal is performed by using
the best blocking pairs in K . The matching is generated from the proposal vector G as defined in Section 2. Observe
that these matchings may not be men-saturating and therefore some men and women may be unmatched. The upward
traversal is performed by matching those men who are either unmatched or matched to a woman in a blocking pair.
Clearly, the length of the sequence of these matchings is at most O(m2).
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6 Algorithm δ: Stable Matching at the Shortest Distance
In this section, we give an algorithm, called Algorithm δ, that finds the stable matching with the least distance of all
stable matchings relative to the initial proposal vector.
Given an arbitrary proposal vector (not necessarily a matching) I , we want to find a stable matching M such that
the distance between the proposal vector I and the stable matching M is minimized over all stable matchings, M.
The distance we consider here is L1 distance, a.k.a Manhattan distance between two vectors. We denote the distance
as dist(I,M) = ‖I −M‖1. The problem hence can be rephrased as: find the marriage M ∈ M that minimizes
dist(I,M).
It is well-known that the convex hull of stable matchings of an arbitrary bipartite preference system can be described
by a linear system Rothblum (1992) as follows:
∑
j∈[w]
xi,j ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ [m] (1a)
∑
i∈[m]
xi,j ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ [w] (1b)
∑
i′∈[m];i′>ji
xi′,j +
∑
j′∈[w];j′>ij
xi,j′ + xi,j ≥ 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ [m]× [w] (1c)
Here, we define that for eachman or woman i, p >i q denotes that i prefers p over q in his/her preference list. Rothblum
Rothblum (1992) proved that the linear system above is integral, i.e. every basic feasible solution of Equation 1 is
integral. Suppose that every possible marriage (i, j) has a cost c(i, j), we can find a minimum-cost stable matching in
polynomial time by solving the LP above.
Now we show that our problem of minimizing the distance between an initial proposal vector and any stable matching
can be translated into a minimum-cost stable matching problem with a carefully designed cost function.
For each pair (i, j), we assign the cost c(i, j) = |I[i]−mrank[i][j]|. Hence, for each stable matchingM , we have:
dist(I,M) =
∑
i∈[m]
|I[i]−M [i]|
=
∑
(i,j)∈[m]×[w]
c(i, j) · 1ρ(M,i)=j
Hence, we can rewrite our problem as:
minimize
∑
(i,j)∈[m]×[w]
ci,j · xi,j (2a)
subject to
∑
j∈[w]
xi,j ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ [m], (2b)
∑
i∈[m]
xi,j ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ [w], (2c)
∑
i′∈[m];i′>ji
xi′,j +
∑
j′∈[w];j′>ij
xi,j′ + xi,j ≥ 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ [m]× [w] (2d)
Solving the above LP gives us a stable matching that is nearest to the initial proposal vector. This LP has O(n2)
variables and constraints where n is the total number of men and women. However, we note that the minimum-
cost stable matching problem can be reduced to the minimum-cost closed subset of a poset due to the rotation poset
structure of stable matching problem. See Gusfield and Irving (1989) for more details of rotation poset. Feder Feder
(1994) has shown that the minimum-cost stable matching problem in a bipartite preference system can be solved in
O(n3) time ifmax(ci,j) = O(n) .
We summarize the preceding discussion as the following theorem.
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Theorem 3 Given an arbitrary proposal vector I , we can find a stable matching M that minimizes the distance
dist(I,M) over all stable matchings in O(n3) time where n is the total number of men and women.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We have proposed algorithms to find a stable matching starting from a given initial matching or an initial proposal
vector. Algorithm α (β) returns the stable matching with least distance of all stable matching that are better than the
initial matching from the women’s perspective (the man’s perspective) in O(n2) time. Algorithm δ returns the stable
matching with least distance from the initial proposal vector in O(n3) time. The following problem is open. Is there
an efficient O(n2) algorithm that returns the closest stable proposal vector given any initial proposal vector I?
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input: Stable marriage instance mpref and wrank, an initial proposal vector I
output: the smallest stable marriage greater than or equal to I (if one exists)
mList: list of men initially empty; // men who need to advance
G: array[1..m] of 1..w;
curBest:array[1..w] of 0..m initially 0; // current best proposal until G
numw: int initially 0; // number of women who have received proposals until G
G := I;
if (∃i : G[i] > m) return null; // ”no stable matching exists”
// Step 1: initialize curBest
for i ∈ [1..m] do
for k ∈ [1..G[i]] do
q := mpref [i][k];
if (curBest[q] = 0) then // first proposal to q encountered
curBest[q] := i;
numw := numw + 1;
if (numw > m) return null; // ”no stable matching exists”
else if (wrank[q][i] < wrank[q][curBest[q]]) then
curBest[q] := i;
// Step 2: initialize mList
for i ∈ [1..m] do
q := ρ(G, i);
if (curBest[q] 6= i) then
append i to mList;
// Step 3: Advance on elements from mList
while (mList 6= {})
i := first element in mList;
if (G[i] < m)) G[i] := G[i] + 1; // try the next choice
else return null; // ”no stable matching exists”
q := ρ(G, i); // woman for that choice number
if (curBest[q] = 0) then
numw := numw + 1;
if (numw > m) then return null; // ”no stable matching exists”
curBest[q] := i;
remove i from mList;
else if (wrank[q][i] < wrank[q][curBest[q]]) then
if (ρ(G, curBest[q]) = q) then append curBest[q] to mList;
curBest[q] := i;
remove i from mList;
endwhile;
return G;
Figure 7: An Implementation of Algorithm α with O(m2 + w) complexity.
8 Appendix
8.1 An Efficient Implementation of Algorithm α
In this section, we give an O(m2 + w) implementation of Algorithm α. The GS algorithm maintains two data
structures. First, it maintains a list of men who are unmatched and must advance on their preference list. We also
maintain mList, a list of men that are forbidden in the current proposal vector. Second, the GS algorithm maintains
an array partner such that partner[q] returns the partner for woman q in the proposal vectorG.
We maintain an array curBest instead of partner such that curBest[q] returns the most preferred match for woman
q among all proposals such that the proposal to woman q by man i is for a choice less than or equal to G[i]. Note that
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if the most preferred match for q is before G, then partner[q] may be zero even though curBest[q] is nonzero. Such
a scenario cannot happen in the GS algorithm because a man can advance on his list only when his current matched
woman gets a better proposal. For example, consider the men’s preference lists in Fig. 2. Suppose the initial vector is
(2, 2, 1). In this proposal vector, curBest[2] (the current best proposal to w2) is from m2. However, m2 has moved
on to the next woman on his list w3. Hence,m2 is not the partner of w2.
The implementation shown in Fig. 7 takes as input a stable marriage instance specified by mpref (the men’s pref-
erences) and wrank (the women’s ranking of men), and the initial proposal vector I . Step 1 goes over all proposals
made inG or beforeG and computes the current best proposal for every woman q. It also counts the number of unique
women who have received proposals. If that number exceedsm, the algorithm returns null.
Step 2 goes over all men whose proposals are not the current best proposals and inserts them in mList. All man i in
mList are such that they satisfy forbidden(G, i).
Step 3 advances G over proposals that are forbidden. It takes out an element i from mList. It advances to the next
choice of woman q. If q does not have any proposal and proposing to her does not increase numw beyondm, or if i is
preferred over the current best proposal for q so far, we have succeeded in removing i frommList. If q had a partner,
then that man is added to mList. If we run out of choices for any man i, then the algorithm returns null. If the while
loop terminates, we have that there is no i such that forbidden(G, i) and therefore G is a stable marriage and it is
returned.
The correctness of the implementation easily follows from Lemma 8 and Lemma 3.
Lemma 8 The while loop in Fig. 7 satisfies the following invariants.
1. For all q: curBest[q] is the highest ranked proposer to q who has made proposal to q in any proposal vector
less than or equal to G.
2. For all i: forbidden(G, i) iff curBest[ρ(G, i)] 6= i.
3. i ∈ mList iff curBest[ρ(G, i)] 6= i.
G is advanced on index i only when forbidden(G, i). Lemma 8 proves that this holds iff i ∈ mList. When mList
is empty, none of the components of G are forbidden and it corresponds to a stable marriage. If it is not possible to
advance on some forbidden index i or if more thanm woman have been proposed beforeG, the algorithm returns null
in accordance with Lemma 1 and Lemma 3.
Proof:
1. Step 1 establishes the invariant for G equal to I . In the while loop of Step 3, whenever G[i] is incremented
such that woman q is proposed by i, the invariant is maintained by updating curBest[q].
2. Let q be equal to ρ(G, i). We first show that curBest[q] 6= i implies forbidden(G, i). If q has another
proposal inG and curBest[q] is not equal to i, then man i is unmatched inG and therefore forbidden(G, i)
holds. If q does not have any other proposal in G, then curBest[q] 6= i implies forbidden(G, i.
Conversely, if forbidden(G, i) then either i is unmatched in G or her match in G is part of a blocking pair.
In either case, there exists j 6= i such that q prefers j to i and j has a proposal in G or before G. Hence,
curBest[q] 6= i.
3. Step 2 establishes the invariant at the beginning of the while loop. Any man i is removed from mList only
when curBest[ρ(G, i)] = i.
Let us analyze the time complexity of Algorithm α. Initialization takes O(m + w) time. Step 1 takes O(m2) time
because G[i] ≤ m. Step 2 takes O(m) time to compute mList. Step 3 increases G[i] for some i in every iteration.
Each iteration can be done in O(1) time and noG[i] can exceedm. Thus, the algorithm takes O(m2 +w) time which
reduces to the standardO(n2) time complexity of the GS algorithm when bothm and w are equal to n. The algorithm
does not process more thanm choices for any man even if the number of women exceeds the number of men. This is
sufficient because there cannot exist any stable marriage that includes a choice beyond the choice numberm for any
man.
8.2 An Efficient Implementation of Algorithm β
We now discuss an efficient implementation of the downward traversal shown in Fig. 8. The implementation uses the
following data structures. The variable wchoice is the rank of the best proposal that a woman may have in any vector
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input: mpref, wpref : men and women preferences;
mrank: men ranking of women,
I: initial proposal vector;
output: the greatest stable marriage less than or equal to I (if one exists)
wList: list of women; // women in blocking pairs
wchoice: array[1..w] of 1..m ;
G: array[1..m] of 1..w;
// Step 1: Set G to I ensuring that it does not exceedm
G[i] := min(I[i],m);
// Step 2: Trim G so that proposals are only to women in man-optimal marriage L
L := α((1, 1, . . . , 1));
if (∃i : G[i] < L[i]) return null; // ”no stable matching less than or equal to G exists”
W ′ := set of women matched in L;
for i ∈ [1..m] do
k := L[i];
while (k < G[i]) ∧ (mpref [i][k + 1] ∈ W ′)
k := k + 1;
G[i] := k;
// Step 3: Satisfy all potential blocking pairs
wList := W ′;
for j ∈ W ′ : wchoice[j] := 1;
while (wList 6= {})
q := first element in wList;
p := wpref [q][wchoice[q]];
if (mrank[p][q] = G[p]) then //q is assigned to her best choice
remove q from wList;
else if mrank[p][q] > G[p] then// this man has not proposed to q until G
wchoice[q] + + ;
else // (mrank[p][q] < G[p])
wList := wList ∪ ρ(G, p); // add the current woman partner for p to wList
G[p] := mrank[p][q]; // satisfy the blocking pair (p, q)
remove q from wList;
endwhile;
return G;
Figure 8: An Implementation of Algorithm β with O(m2 + w) complexity.
less than or equal to G. If wchoice[q] = k, then the woman q has a proposal from her kth top choice in some vector
less than or equal to G. The variable wList is the list of all women who may be part of some blocking pair in G.
When wList becomes empty we know thatG is stable. The variablemrank[p][q] stores the rank of woman q for man
p. Ifmrank[p][q] equals 1, then q is the top choice for man p.
In the first step, we ensure that no component ofG exceedsm. Since there aremmen andG[i] ≤ m, there are O(m2)
proposals up toG. These proposals may be to different women. In step 2, we further trimG to guarantee that we never
have to handle more thanm women. Recall that our goal is to get an algorithm whose complexity is at most linear in
the number of women. To that end, we first claim the following
Theorem 4 LetW ′ be the set of women that are part of the man-optimal marriage.
(a) Any stable marriage can only include women fromW ′.
(b) Any matchingG such that a man i prefers a woman outside ofW ′ to ρ(G, i) is not stable.
Proof: (a) Consider anyG that is a man-saturating matching with a woman outside ofW ′. Suppose for contradiction
G is a stable matching. Let Go be the man optimal stable matching. Then Go ≤ G. However, this means that the
number of unique women proposed until G exceedsm. Hence, G or any proposal vector greater than G cannot be a
15
A PREPRINT - JULY 15, 2020
stable marriage from Lemma 1.
(b) Consider any G that is a man-saturating matching such that some man i prefers a woman outside ofW to ρ(G, i).
Suppose G is stable. From part (a), we conclude that G includes proposal tom women inW ′. Furthermore, if man i
prefers a woman outside ofW ′, we get that the number of unique women proposed until G exceedsm. Hence, from
Lemma 1, G cannot be stable.
We exploit Theorem 4 as follows. At step 2, we find the man-optimal stable marriage L. If there is any component i
of G such that G[i] is less than L[i], then clearly there cannot be a stable marriage beforeG. Now based on L, we can
determine W ′, the set of women that can be part of any stable marriage. We now decrease G[i] for each i such that
proposals are made until G[i] are only to women in W ′. This step would not be required if the number of men and
women were equal.
In the third step, we ensure that there is no man i such that rForbidden(G, i). Instead of maintaining forbidden men,
it is easier to maintainwList, the list of all women inW ′ who may be part of blocking pairs inG. We initialize wList
to all women in W ′. Whenever wList becomes empty, there are no blocking pairs. To satisfy a blocking pair, we
first remove a woman q from wList. We determine p, the top choice of that woman q in a vector less than or equal
to G. There are three possibilities: (1) If p is matched with q in G, then we are done with processing of q and q is
deleted from wList. (2) If p has not made proposal to q in any vector before G, then the woman q must move on to
her next choice. (3) If p had a proposal to q before G but not in G, then we have that (p, q) is a blocking pair. Since
we are exploring choices in the order of wchoice, (p, q) is the best blocking pair for q. We satisfy this blocking pair
by moving G[p] to the choice given by the woman q. This step corresponds to a downward traversal in the proposal
lattice and the assignment for man p improves with this step. Since q has her best proposal, she is deleted from wList.
The current partner of p is added to wList, if not already on the list.
In the algorithm β, wchoice for any woman can only increase. As wchoice increases, women are assigned less
preferable choices. Similarly, the vector G which corresponds to choices by men only decreases with the algorithm.
Hence, the assignment to men only improves with the execution of the algorithm.
We now have the following result that shows correctness of the implementation of Algorithm β.
Theorem 5 Given any proposal vector I , Algorithm β in Fig. 8 returns the greatest stable proposal vector less than
or equal to I .
8.3 Proof of Theorem 5
Theorem 6 Given any proposal vector I , Algorithm β in Fig. 8 returns the greatest stable proposal vector less than
or equal to I .
To show the correctness of the implementation, we first show the following Lemma.
Lemma 9 The while loop in Step 3 of Fig. 8 has the following invariants.
1. For any woman q, wchoice is always less than or equal to the top choice she has before G.
2. Any woman q such that (p, q) is a best blocking pair, is included in wList.
3. Any proposal vector H such that H is less than or equal to I and H [i] > G[i] for some i is not a stable
marriage.
Proof:
1. It is initially true because wchoice[q] is initialized to 1 for all q ∈ W ′. It is incremented only when
mrank[p][q] > G[p], i.e., the man corresponding to wchoice[q] has proposal to q afterG[p].
2. It is true initially because every woman in included in wList before the while loop. A woman is removed
from wList only whenG[p] equalsmrank[p][q] where p is her top choice beforeG, i.e., q is matched to her
top choice of all proposals made at or beforeG.
3. The invariant holds initially because Step 1 and 2 decrease G[i] from I[i] only when it either is beyondmth
choice (step 1), or to a woman outside ofW ′ (step 2). Now suppose that the invariant holds at the beginning
of the while loop. We decreaseG[p] tomrank[p][q] only when there exists a woman q such thatmrank[p][q]
is less than G[p]. Consider any proposal vector such that H [p] is greater thanmrank[p][q]. By part 1 of this
Lemma, q prefers p to any assignment it may have inH . Also, man p prefers q to any assignment it may have
inH (becausemrank[p][q] < H [p]). Hence, (p, q) is a blocking pair in H .
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We now give the proof of Theorem 5. Proof: We initialize G to I . It is sufficient to show that any component p
of G is decreased iff rForbidden(G, p). First, suppose that rForbidden(G, p) holds. This implies that there exists
a woman q such that (p, q) is a best blocking pair. From Lemma 9 part 2, q is included in wList. Whenever q is
the first element in wList, mrank[p][q] is less than G[p] and G[p] is decreased. Conversely, G[p] is decreases when
mrank[p][q] < G[p]. This implies rForbidden(G, p).
The number of women who have been proposed untilG at the beginning of step 2, is at most O(m) irrespective of the
total number of women in the system. The while loop removes a woman from wList, increases wchoice for at least
one woman, or decreases G[p] for some man p in every iteration. Each of these actions can be done at most O(m2)
number of times over all iterations giving us the time complexity of Algorithm β as O(m2 + w).
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